Micro-UAV Detection and Classification from RF Fingerprints Using
  Machine Learning Techniques by Ezuma, Martins et al.
Micro-UAV Detection and Classification from RF
Fingerprints Using Machine Learning Techniques
Martins Ezuma, Fatih Erden, Chethan Kumar Anjinappa, Ozgur Ozdemir, and Ismail Guvenc
Department of ECE
North Carolina State University
Raleigh, NC 27606
{mcezuma,ferden,canjina,oozdemi,iguvenc}@ncsu.edu
Abstract—This paper focuses on the detection and classification
of micro-unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) using radio frequency
(RF) fingerprints of the signals transmitted from the controller
to the micro-UAV. In the detection phase, raw signals are split
into frames and transformed into the wavelet domain to remove
the bias in the signals and reduce the size of data to be processed.
A naive Bayes approach, which is based on Markov models
generated separately for UAV and non-UAV classes, is used to
check for the presence of a UAV in each frame. In the classifica-
tion phase, unlike the traditional approaches that rely solely on
time-domain signals and corresponding features, the proposed
technique uses the energy transient signal. This approach is
more robust to noise and can cope with different modulation
techniques. First, the normalized energy trajectory is generated
from the energy-time-frequency distribution of the raw control
signal. Next, the start and end points of the energy transient
are detected by searching for the most abrupt changes in the
mean of the energy trajectory. Then, a set of statistical features
is extracted from the energy transient. Significant features are
selected by performing neighborhood component analysis (NCA)
to keep the computational cost of the algorithm low. Finally,
selected features are fed to several machine learning algorithms
for classification. The algorithms are evaluated experimentally
using a database containing 100 RF signals from each of 14
different UAV controllers. The signals are recorded wirelessly
using a high-frequency oscilloscope. The data set is randomly
partitioned into training and test sets for validation with the
ratio 4:1. Ten Monte Carlo simulations are run and results are
averaged to assess the performance of the methods. All the micro-
UAVs are detected correctly and an average accuracy of 96.3%
is achieved using the k-nearest neighbor (kNN) classification.
Proposed methods are also tested for different signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) levels and results are reported.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, non-military micro-unmanned aerial vehi-
cles (micro-UAVs) have proliferated conspicuously. Besides
the recreational use by hobbyists, there is a growing interest
in the use of micro-UAVs for commercial applications. One
of the major areas of use is in precision agriculture, where
micro-UAVs make it easy to map and survey farmlands
for crop variability and phenology, crop dusting/spraying for
weed and pest control, irrigation management, and livestock
monitoring [1]. Other commercial applications of micro-UAVs
include infrastructure health monitoring, package delivery,
media & entertainment, and ad hoc access point Internet
connectivity [2]–[5]. Due to the potential benefits of micro-
UAVs, there is a collaborative plan by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) to integrate commercial micro-UAVs
into the national airspace (NAS) [6].
Even though so many beneficial civilian applications of
micro-UAVs abound, there is an associated risk to the public
safety. In recent times, there have been reports of micro-UAVs
violating public privacy and the security of sensitive facilities
such as nuclear power plants and airports [7]. In 2018, a
drone was intentionally crashed into a nuclear power plant in
France [8]. According to the FAA, reports of safety-incidents
involving drones now average about 250 a month [9]. Some
of these events involve micro-UAVs crashing into commercial
airplanes, military helicopters, the White House, and outdoor
public events. Apparently, most of these events occur when
drone pilots intentionally violate no-fly-zone restrictions. In
addition, micro-UAVs have been exploited by terror groups
for the placement of improvised explosive devices (IED)
and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives
(CBRNE) [10]. Recently, two armed commercial drones car-
rying powerful explosives detonated close to the Venezuelan
president during an outdoor event [11]. Therefore, there is
an urgent need to secure the national airspace against such
unconventional threats. This can be achieved by accurately
detecting and identifying non-compliant micro-UAVs.
Several techniques have been proposed for micro-UAV
detection and classification so far. Conventional radar-based
techniques, which are widely deployed for detecting and
identifying aircrafts, mostly fail to detect micro-UAVs [12].
Alternative techniques like sound and video-based detection
are only suitable for short-range scenarios due to ambient
noise [13]. Some of these challenges can be addressed by radio
frequency (RF) fingerprints-based techniques. However, the
current trend on RF fingerprint classification of micro-UAVs
focuses mostly on time-domain techniques which are not very
effective. This is because time domain techniques are based
on the assumption that there is an abrupt change at the start
point of the signal. However, this assumption is not always
true when the transition between the transient and noise is
more gradual [14]. Consequently, time domain techniques may
delay the detection of the transient of the signal. In worst case
scenario, this may increase the probability of missed target
detection at low signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR).
This paper is motivated by the need to address the afore-
mentioned challenges. Due to the problems associated with
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the use of the time-domain transient analysis, a new approach
for the micro-UAV classification is proposed in this paper. In
this approach, the time-domain signal is first transformed into
the energy-time-frequency domain and the energy trajectory is
computed. Then, a set of statistical features is extracted from
the energy transient instead of the time-domain transient. The
dimensionality of the feature set is reduced using neighbor-
hood component analysis (NCA) and the significant features
are classified using several machine learning algorithms. It is
shown that the discriminating features can still be extracted
even when the time-domain signal waveform is distorted by
noise. Moreover, a micro-UAV detection method is described
in this paper. RF signals are transformed into the wavelet
domain to remove the bias and reduce the size of the data.
Then, the naive Bayes approach is used based on the Markov
models to differentiate between the noise and micro-UAV
signals.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II gives an
overview of the state-of-the-art techniques for micro-UAV de-
tection and classification; Section III provides a description of
the process model for the approach; Section IV and Section V
describes the proposed detection and classification techniques
respectively; Section VI describes the experimental setup and
presents the results; and Section VII provides the concluding
remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
Existing techniques for micro-UAV detection and classifi-
cation can be categorized under four headings, namely, radar-
based, vision-based, sound-based, and RF fingerprinting.
A. Radar-based Techniques
Micro-UAV detection using radars have been widely stud-
ied. Radars transmit electromagnetic signals which interact
with the target, in particular, the micro-UAVs. This interaction
causes a shift in the carrier frequency of the received signal due
to the Doppler effect. In addition to the main Doppler shift, if
the target has vibrating or rotating structures, e.g., propellers,
vibrating platforms, and engines, these micro-motions will
induce time-varying frequency modulation on the received
signal [15]. These additional frequency modulations, called the
micro-Doppler effect, generate side-bands (or spectral lines)
around the main Doppler frequency shift. Analysis of the
micro-Doppler signature may review some of the dynamic
characteristic of the target that can be used for target detection
and identification [16], [17].
In [18], the micro-Doppler signature of a quad-copter is
compared with that of a walking human. The study concludes
that the unique micro-Doppler signature of the micro-UAVs
are useful for the design of an automatic target recognition
(ATR) system. These unique features can be used to dis-
tinguish micro-UAVs from fixed-wing airplanes, helicopter,
and birds. In [19], micro-UAVs and small birds are classified
based on the eigenpairs extracted from the decomposition of
their micro-Doppler signatures. Larger birds can be readily
recognized and discriminated from small-UAVs because of the
frequency modulation induced by their flapping wings [20],
[21]. These flapping-induced micro-Doppler frequencies ap-
pear at a much lower frequency-band as compared to the
micro-Doppler frequencies induced by the rotating propellers
of the micro-UAVs. Sparsity-based techniques can also be
used to extract features from radar micro-Doppler signatures.
In [22], [23], orthogonal matching pursuit (OMP), a sparse-
coding based dictionary learning algorithm, is used to extract
features from the radar micro-Doppler signatures for automatic
target recognition.
Although radar-based detection has been one of the main-
stream approaches to the problem, their performance, i.e.,
maximum detectable range, is highly limited if the target
has a low radar cross-section [24]. This also explains why
stealth aircrafts, designed to avoid radar detection, must have
very low radar cross section (RCS). A conventional aircraft
(without stealth coating) has an average RCS value of 426.58
m2 (26.3 dBsm) at lateral incidence to a millimeter wave
radar signal [25]. Therefore, in order to evade detection,
military aircrafts are coated with radiation-absorbent materials
(RAM) to reduce the RCS. On the other hand, experimental
measurements at millimeter wave frequencies show that many
commercially available micro-UAVs have an average RCS
value of about 0.02 m2 (-16.98 dBsm) [26]–[28]. This very
low RCS value is due to the shape and design material of
these micro-UAVs. Therefore, many micro-UAVs are naturally
stealth to conventional radars [24]. This explains the failure of
the United States White House’s surveillance radar to detect
a micro-UAV flying across the fence and crash-landing into
the lawn [12]. This challenge with radar-based detection has
motivated researchers to investigate other detection techniques
for micro-UAVs.
B. Vision-based Techniques
In [29], a computer vision-based technique is described
for micro-UAVs detection. This approach uses high resolution
cameras to capture micro-UAVs in different background en-
vironments. Several features such as Haar-like, histogram of
gradients (HOG), and local binary patterns (LBP) are extracted
from the images. These features are fed into cascades of
boosted classifiers for target detection. The cascaded boosted
classifiers perform detection at multi-stage sequences with
increasing complexity. In this system, only test sets that pass
the previous stage are allowed into the next stage.
Deep learning networks have also been explored for the
micro-UAV detection problem. Usually, deep learning tech-
niques do not rely on the human crafted features for target
detection. They autonomously learn the optimal features from
the captured micro-UAV images. In [30], [31], convolution
neural networks (CNN) are investigated for micro-UAV detec-
tion. These deep learning based techniques show fairly good
performance. However, training CNN networks requires huge
amount of data making real-time application computationally
expensive.
In [32], [33], the authors described a computer-vision ap-
proach based on a generic Fourier descriptor (GFD). The tech-
nique uses speeded-up robust features (SURF) for keypoint
detection on grayscale images of micro-UAVs. The keypoints
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of interest are shape-descriptors of the micro-UAVs. In com-
parison to CNN, this method provides much faster detection
for micro-UAVs. However, all vision-based techniques suffer
from one common problem. The performance of the camera
sensors depends on the ambient condition such as lighting.
In addition, vision-based detection of micro-UAVs may not
perform well if the surveyed area is large.
C. Sound-based Techniques
Acoustic or sound-based techniques use arrays of micro-
phones to extract the unique acoustic signature of micro-UAVs.
Typically, micro-UAVs produce hissing or buzz-like sounds
in frequencies ranging from 400 Hz to 8 kHz [34]. This
unique acoustic signature is due to the brushless DC motor of
micro-UAVs. Using different audio analysis techniques, micro-
UAVs can be separated from the background noise. In [35],
micro-UAV localization and tracking using an acoustic array is
described. The micro-UAVs are localized based on estimation
of the time difference of arrival (TDOA) of the received audio
signals. In order to accurately compute TDOA, the authors
proposed an algorithm based on the Gauss priori probability
density function (GPDF).
In [36], time and frequency domain acoustic features are
extracted from micro-UAV audio recordings. These features
are used to train a multi-class support vector machine (SVM)
for micro-UAV identification. In [37], the authors investigate
the effectiveness of Gaussian mixture model (GMM) and deep
learning algorithms for drone sound detection. The problem,
modeled as a binary classification problem, is based on the
detection of sound events. The study concludes that a long
short-term memory (LSTM) recurrent neural network (RNN)
shows the best micro-UAV sound detection performance. In
[38], micro-UAV detection using hybrid advanced acoustic
cameras is described. The system comprises 120 elements
microphone array and a video camera. The microphones are
spherically arranged. Thus, allowing the system to simulta-
neously detect multiple micro-UAVs in 2D (angular position)
or 3D dimensions. The angular direction of a micro-UAV is
estimated using the phase of the acquired audio signals from
the micro-UAVs.
In [39], a similar hybrid audio-assisted detection system for
micro-UAVs is described. The system consists of thirty high-
definition cameras and three microphones. In order to perform
micro-UAV detection, HOG features are extracted from image
data and mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) features
from the audio data. An SVM is trained to perform detection
on the test data set. The fundamental challenge of the audio-
based systems is the practical range of the commercial micro-
phones. Most of them have a range of 25-30 ft [13] and are
highly sensitive to environmental noise.
D. RF fingerprinting
RF fingerprint-based detection relies on the characteristics
of the RF signals of the micro-UAV controllers. Experimental
investigations show that the micro-UAV controllers have a
unique RF signature due to the circuitry design and modulation
techniques employed. Therefore, RF fingerprint analysis can
help detect and classify micro-UAVs. Unlike the radar-based
techniques, the RF sensing device/receiver is a passive listener
and does not transmit any signal. This makes RF fingerprint-
based detection energy efficient. In addition, the challenge of
detecting micro-UAVs (with extremely low RCSs) is solved
since all that is required is to intercept the transmit signal
from the micro-UAV controller. The range problem associated
with the vision and acoustic-based techniques can be solved
by using high-gain receiver antennas together with a highly
sensitive receiver system to listen for the micro-UAV controller
signals. The issue of environmental noise can be suppressed
by employing several de-noising techniques, e.g., wavelet
decomposition and band pass filtering. These advantages make
RF fingerprint detection techniques a promising solution.
In [40], GMMs are to detect the transient start points of
signals transmitted by a micro-UAV controller. This time-
domain technique uses the expectation maximization (EM)
algorithm for estimating the detection threshold. However,
EM algorithm is not guaranteed to converge to a global
optimal. Furthermore, in order to justify the use of GMM to
model the RF signal sampled with a high frequency, many
Gaussian components are needed. This will definitely increase
the computational cost of the detection algorithm. In [41],
RF hash fingerprints are used to detect the micro-UAVs. The
RF hash fingerprints are generated by calculating the distance
between peak locations in the envelope of the time-domain RF
signal. The extracted fingerprints are used to train a distance-
based support vector data description (SVDD) algorithm for
target detection. However, since most micro-UAV controller
signals have similar time-domain waveforms with random
spikes, time domain peak classification is not very effective.
III. UAV DETECTION/CLASSIFICATION SCENARIO
AND ASSUMPTIONS
Fig.1 shows the system setup for RF-based UAV detection
and identification. The detection system is an RF sensing
device which can capture signals from both the UAV and its
controller. In addition, the RF receiver also captures other
signals in the environment which co-exist with the UAV
transmissions in the same frequency band. Our overall goal
in this paper is to develop an algorithm which is capable of
detecting a micro-UAV and, if present, identifying the type of
it based on the extracted RF fingerprint of the UAV controller
signal. Thus, the process is divided into two major tasks,
namely, the detection and classification. The detection stage
makes a decision of whether the captured RF signal belongs to
a micro-UAV or the noise signal. If a micro-UAV is detected,
then the classification stage is invoked to make a decision
regarding the type of the micro-UAV. Fig. 2 is a flowchart
that provides a graphical description of the overall process
model that involves UAV detection and classification.
The starting point for target classification is the target de-
tection. This is achieved by continuously sensing the 2.4 GHz
channel for the presence of transmissions by a non cooperative
UAV controller. Experimentally, it was observed that it is
much effective to detect the signal from the UAV controller
as against the transmission from the UAV itself because the
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Fig. 2. Flowchart of the classification algorithm.
former has higher energy than the latter. For this work we
focus exclusively on the detection/classification of the RF
signal from the controller; RF signal detection/classification
from the UAV is left as a future work.
Contrary to the classical energy detector system, which
sets a single fixed threshold for target detection, the proposed
system is based on state transition probabilities. This approach
reduces the probability of false alarm due to random burst in
the background noise. Moreover, this approach is motivated by
the fact that actual RF signal waveforms from UAV controllers
can be considered as a time-varying spectral vector sequences
with multiple transients.
Fig. 3 shows typical RF signal waveforms captured from
six different micro-UAV controllers. These waveforms look
distinct with well defined transitions. Therefore, Markov based
models can be effectively used to detect the UAV controller
signal from the background noise. In this work, the back-
ground noise is modelled as an additive white Gaussian noise.
According to [42], the maximum intercept range of the RF
sensing system can be modelled as:
RImax =
λ
4pi
√
PtGtGI
LδI
, (1)
where λ, Pt and Gt represents the transmit wavelength, trans-
mit power and antenna gain of the UAV controller respectively,
GI is the antenna gain of the RF receiver (intercept) system,
L is the combined losses between the controller and receiver
(transmission and system losses) and δI is the sensitivity of the
receiver. Moreover, the RF receiver sensitivity, δI, is defined
as:
δI = kToFBρi , (2)
where k = 1.38×10−23 Joules/k is Boltzmann constant, To =
290 k is the standard noise temperature, F is the noise factor of
the receiver, B is the bandwidth of the receiver and ρi is the
SNR at the input of the receiver. In practice, the maximum
range can be increased by using directional antenna for far
field detection.
The next task after signal detection is the classification pro-
cess. This is achieved by using machine learning algorithms.
First, the energy trajectory features of the captured RF signal
waveform is extracted from the spectrogram representation
of the signal. Thereafter, feature selection is then performed
using Neighborhood component analysis (NCA). The selected
features are used for training and testing of the machine
learning models used for the classification.
4
In the following, first, Section IV will provide a detailed
description of the proposed RF-based UAV detection approach,
while Section V will focus on the UAV classification problem.
IV. UAV DETECTION USING RF SIGNALS
First step in Fig. 2 is capturing RF signal data and the
detection of the presence of a UAV signal in the data. In
our experiments, the RF signals to be detected are captured
from different micro-UAV controllers using a high-frequency
oscilloscope. The details of the experimental setup and data
collection are given in Section VI. Each RF signal is recorded
such that it is a vector of the same size.
Fig. 3 shows the typical RF signals received from six
different micro-UAV controllers. As it is clear from the figure,
each micro-UAV signal has a different waveform which can
be attributed to the unique characteristics of the transmitter
circuits, modulation techniques, and the packet structure. This
makes it unreliable to use simple thresholding techniques to
detect micro-UAVs especially in noisy environments. It is
also difficult to detect the time-domain transient to obtain the
fingerprint of the corresponding control signal because the end
point of the transient is not clear unless there is an overshoot
in the signal.
In order to perform detection, all non-UAV signals are
classified as noise. This includes background noise in the
receiver itself and interference from all other wireless sources
such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and microwave oven which operate
in same frequency band. Thus, the overall goal of the detection
algorithm is to classify the received signals as belonging to
the UAV or non-UAV class. However, due to the lack of data
for the non-UAV class at this point of a time, we restrict
our discussion to the classification of UAV and noise signals,
albeit, the proposed method is developed for a more general
case. Other wireless sources will be explored in our future
work. Therefore, the detection problem boils down to detecting
the presence/absence of a UAV based on the received RF
signals in a noisy environment.
A pre-processing process is applied to the RF signals before
proceeding with the detection algorithm. The RF signals are
transformed into the wavelet domain using a pre-defined
wavelet tree. The rationale behind the adapted technique [43]
is that it helps in detecting the possible RF signals even in
the low SNR regime. This leads to a better detection ability
which is a necessity for applications like micro-UAV threat
detection.
A. Pre-processing Step
The SNR of the received RF signal varies with the distance
and transmitted power of the wireless source. Higher SNRs
can be achieved in multiple ways [43], [44]. One such way
is the use of the wavelet transform for removing the bias in
the received RF signals and de-noising up to a certain extent.
[43], [45], [46]. The use of wavelets provides the two-fold
advantage compared to the traditional time domain and Fourier
domain analysis [47]. One is the improvement in the SNR
(de-noising) and other in the data compression without loss
of information. The former aspect is important to improve
the detection capability. The latter aspect is important for
low complexity system design which result in faster detection
algorithms.
In this study, a three-stage wavelet decomposition is used as
shown in Fig. 4. Low-pass g[n] and high-pass h[n] filters of
the Haar transform are chosen due to their simplicity. Each
filter is followed by a down sampler. Wavelet coefficients
obtained after the third level are considered as inputs to
the detection algorithm both for training and testing the RF
signals. An example of the RF signal received from the micro-
UAV controller of DJI Matrice 100 and the corresponding
wavelet transformed signal is shown in Fig. 5. It is clear from
the figure that the wavelet transform removes the bias and
reduces the number of samples while preserving the structure
associated with the original raw signal.
B. Bayesian Decision Making
We use a Bayesian approach for the decision making
process. To state the general problem, let C ∈ {0, 1} be an
index denoting the class of the measured RF signal y. When
y ∈ UAV class then C = 1; otherwise C = 0. Let yT be
a vector containing the transformed RF signal y. Then, the
posterior probability of the UAV class given yT is
P (C = 1|yT ) = P (yT |C = 1)P (C = 1)
P (yT )
, (3)
where P (yT |C = 1) is the likelihood function conditioned
on C = 1, P (C = 1) is the prior probability of UAV class,
and P (yT ) is the evidence. A similar expression holds for
P (C = 0|yT ). In terms of posterior probabilities, we decide
C = 1, if
P (C = 1|yT ) ≥ P (C = 0|yT ). (4)
If we assume the number of samples from each of the classes
in the training set are equal, the prior probabilities of the UAV
and noise class become equal. Thus, the decision is favored
to C = 1, if
P (yT |C = 1) ≥ P (yT |C = 0). (5)
While this simplifies the problem of making a decision, there
is still the problem of computing the likelihood P (yT |C =
{0, 1}). This calculation is central to any Bayes decision prob-
lem because it reflects the interdependence of the classes of
nature. In order to capture the dependency between the states,
we incorporate the method discussed in the next subsection.
We will get back to the calculation of the likelihood after we
introduce the concept of states.
A close inspection of the collected data revealed that most of
the UAV signals are differently structured (see Fig. 3). This is
true for signals from other wireless sources as well. However,
the same cannot be said about the noise data. That is, often
the UAV data changes smoothly resulting in consecutive states
of the signal that are not statistically independent. This is
particularly useful when the SNR is low because at low SNRs
the measured signal looks like a random noise.
In order to exploit the dependency between the adjacent
states, we define 3-state Markov models for each class. We
define two thresholds T1 and T2 based on the amplitude of the
5
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Time (s) 10-4
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Am
pl
itu
de
 (V
olt
s)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Time (s) 10-4
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Am
pl
itu
de
 (V
olt
s)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Time (s) 10-4
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Am
pl
itu
de
 (V
olt
s)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Time (s) 10-4
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Am
pl
itu
de
 (V
olt
s)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Time (s) 10-4
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Am
pl
itu
de
 (V
olt
s)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Time (s) 10-4
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Am
pl
itu
de
 (V
olt
s)
Fig. 3. Examples of micro-UAV control signals for six different controllers: (a) DJI Matrice 100, (b) DJI Phantom 3, (c) Hobby King T6A V2, (d) DX6e
Spektrum, (e) JR X9303, and (f) Jeti Duplex DC-16 (from top left to bottom right).
Fig. 4. Three-stage wavelet decomposition.
wavelet transformed noise signal, which are used to distinguish
the three states. The values of T1 and T2 (with T1 > T2) are
fixed based on the training data. We present the rationale of
the choice of T1 and T2 in the subsequent subsections and
validate the choice in the numerical simulation section.
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Fig. 5. The raw signal from DJI Matrice 100 (left) and the corresponding
output (right) obtained at the third stage of the wavelet decomposition.
With the help of the above thresholds, we define three-states
S1, S2, and S3. Based on the amplitude of the signal at each
index n, a state is allotted to that index based on the following
decision rule:
SyT (n) =

S1, yT [n] > T1
S2, T2 ≤ yT [n] ≤ T1
S3, yT [n] < T2
, (6)
where SyT (n) is a set containing the states of the signal. Based
on the above rule, it is straightforward to obtain the states
associated with any time series signal. Once the state sequence
SyT is obtained, the probability of a transition between any
two states is calculated. The transition probability matrix are
generated based on the transitions from adjacent indexed states
as seen in Fig. 6. The transition number and probability matrix
Fig. 6. Definition of transition numbers and probabilities between the states.
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are defined as follows:
TN =
N11 N12 N13N21 N22 N23
N31 N32 N33
 ,
TP =
p11 p12 p13p21 p22 p23
p31 p32 p33
 = TN∑
i,j Nij
,
respectively, where TN is a matrix capturing the number of
transitions between any two states, Nij is the number of
samples transiting from state Si to Sj ; the matrix TP captures
the transition probabilities and is obtained upon normalizing
the TN matrix with the total number of samples. Here, pij
is the transition probability from state Si to Sj for the signal
of interest, i.e., pij = p(Si → Sj). Note that the transition
probabilities generated for the UAV and the noise data will be
different when the considered SNR level is modest. Also, note
that the choice of T1 and T2 dictates the transition probabilities
for both the noise and UAV class data.
The choice of the thresholds has a direct impact on the
decision making process. T1 and T2 are set to ±3σ of the
wavelet transformed environmental noise signal, where σ
represents the standard deviation. The basis for this choice is
that the environmental noise often is modeled as a Gaussian
noise and the noise samples will be within the ±3σ band
with a very high probability (≈ 0.993). The validation of the
choice is presented in the numerical simulation section. Based
on these settings, the UAV and noise class training transition
probabilities are calculated.
The following procedure is followed to obtain the UAV
transition probability matrix. The desired UAV packets from
all the classes are appended and the states and transition
probabilities are generated. A similar approach is employed
to calculate the noise transition probabilities based on the
collected environmental noise data.
For a given test signal, the signal goes through the similar
pre-processing steps. Based on the pre-processed output, the
states are defined and the TN is calculated. Finally, the
likelihood of the class being a UAV is calculated as follows:
P (yT |C = 1) =
∑
i,j={1,2,3}:
P (Si → Sj |C = 1),
=
∏
i,j={1,2,3}:
TPC=1(i, j)
TN (i,j),
=
∏
i,j={1,2,3}:
pN1111;C=1p
N12
12;C=1 . . . p
N33
33;C=1.
(7)
The log-likelihood of the above expression results in
log (P (yT |C = 1)) =
∑
i,j={1,2,3}:
Nij log(pij;C=1). (8)
Similarly, the log-likelihood of the signal coming from a noise
class is calculated by
log (P (yT |C = 0)) =
∑
i,j={1,2,3}:
Nij log(pij;C=0). (9)
The decision will be favored to C = 1, if log(P (yT |C =
1)) ≥ log(P (yT |C = 0)); otherwise, C = 0. We discuss the
detection results in the simulation section for different SNR
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Fig. 7. Spectrogram of the RF signal shown in Fig. 5.
values. If the signal of interest is from the UAV class, then
the classification stage is invoked.
V. UAV CLASSIFICATION USING RF
FINGERPRINTS
We propose a technique based on the energy-time-frequency
domain. Energy transients extracted in this domain can be used
as the fingerprints of the corresponding signals.
For the representation of the RF signals in the energy-time-
frequency domain, we use the spectrogram method. The spec-
trogram of any signal is computed using the squared magni-
tude of the discrete time short-time Fourier transform (STFT)
Spectrogram(n, ω) =
∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
n=−∞
y[m]w[n−m]e−jωn
∣∣∣∣∣
2
, (10)
where y[n] is the captured signal, m is discrete time, ω is
the frequency, and w[n] is a sliding window function that
acts as a filter. In addition, the spectrogram analysis of the
captured RF signals can reveal the transmit frequency of the
signal as well as the frequency hopping patterns. These are
vital detection information. The spectrogram of the RF signal
in Fig. 5 is shown in Fig. 7. It can be clearly seen that the
transmit frequency of the signal is 2.4 GHz.
The spectrogram, by definition, displays the energy/intensity
distribution of the signal along the time-frequency axis.
Therefore, the energy trajectory can be computed from the
spectrogram by taking the maximum energy values along
the time-axis. From this distribution, we estimate the energy
transient by searching for the most abrupt change in the mean
or variance of the normalized energy trajectory. The energy
transient defines the transient characteristics of the signal in
energy domain and is represented by fE(n), n = 1, . . . , N .
For the RF signal in Fig. 5, the normalized energy trajectory
computed from the spectrogram, and the corresponding energy
transient are shown in Fig. 8.
Once the energy transient is detected, the RF fingerprints
are extracted. These fingerprints are the statistical moments
that describe the energy transient. The extracted features are
skewness (γ), variance (σ2), energy spectral entropy (H), and
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Fig. 8. Energy trajectory computed from the spectrogram in Fig. 7.
kurtosis (k). Physically, γ is a measure of the asymmetry of
the energy distribution around the mean value; σ2 measures
the spread of the energy trajectory about the mean value; H
provides a measure of the Shannon entropy (energy spectral
power), and k is a measure of the sharpness or flatness of the
energy transient. These features are defined in terms of the
mean (µ) and standard deviation (σ) of fE as follows
γ(fE) =
1
Nσ3
N∑
n=1
(fE(n)− µ)3
σ2(fE) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
(fE(n)− µ)2
H(fE) = −
N∑
n=1
fE(n) log2 fE(n)
k(fE) =
1
Nσ4
N∑
n=1
(fE(n)− µ)4 .
(11)
The feature sets consisting of the above statistical parameters
are used to train four popular machine learning algorithms:
kNN, discriminant analysis (DA), SVM, and neural networks
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Fig. 9. NCA results showing the relative importance of the statistical features.
(NN) [48]. Since some of the features may be correlated,
and so redundant, we perform feature selection to reduce
the computational cost of the classification algorithm. This
is discussed next.
A. Feature Selection Using NCA
In practice, it is often required to reduce the dimensionality
of a feature set by removing correlated features. By this
means, computational cost of the classification algorithm can
be reduced. Most often, a feature selector is a linear operator
that projects the original data or feature set into a lower
dimensional space. Neighborhood component analysis (NCA)
is such a linear projector.
NCA is a non-parametric, embedded, and supervised learn-
ing method for feature selection. NCA learns a matrix
by which the primary data are transformed into a lower-
dimensional space [49]. In this lower-dimensional space, the
features are ranked according to a weight metric, with the
more important features receiving higher weight values. NCA
achieves this goal by maximizing the regularized objective
function f(w) with respect to the weight variable w. The
regularized objective function is defined as:
f(w) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
pi − λ
p∑
r=1
w2r , (12)
where λ is the regularization term, N is the number of
samples in the feature set, and pi is the average leave-one-out
probability (LOO). In other words, pi is the probability that
NCA correctly learns an observation in the feature set. In order
to perform feature selection, NCA uses the regularization term
to drive to zero all the weights corresponding to the redundant
or correlated features. In [49], NCA is compared with the
linear dimensionality reduction (LDA) on several dataset. It
is observed that if the classes are not convex and cannot be
linearly separated, then LDA result will be inappropriate. In
contrast, NCA adaptively finds the best project matrix without
assuming any parametric structure in the lower dimensional
space. In the same experiment, NCA was shown to outperform
relevant components analysis (RCA) and principal component
analysis (PCA).
NCA ranks the features according to their importance. Fig. 9
shows the results of the NCA performed for the data to be
mentioned in Section VI. Fig. 9 shows the result of NCA. The
RF fingerprints are ranked according to their weight value. As
can be seen, kurtosis has the highest weight and so is the most
important RF fingerprint for this test case. On the other hand,
skewness has the lowest weight and so is the least important
RF fingerprint. This behavior is reasonable because there is
a correlation between the features skewness and kurtosis.
Consequently, for the training and testing, the classifiers can
discard skewness and still produce good results. This can
prevent the over-fitting problem when training the classifiers.
In addition, for large-scale classification problems, there can
be huge computational saving in training the classifiers with
fewer number of significant features.
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TABLE I
UAV CONTROLLER CATALOGUE.
ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Model
Name
DJI Inspire 1 DJI Matrice
100
DJI Phantom
4Pro
DJI Phantom 3 DX5e
Spektrum
DX6e
Spektrum
FlySKy FS-T6
ID 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Model
Name
Futaba T8FG Graupner
MC-32
Hobbie
King-T6A V2
JR X9303 DX6i
Spektrum
Turnigy 9X Jeti Duplex
DC-16
TABLE II
DETECTION PERFORMANCE.
SNR (dB)
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Detection
Accuracy (%)
13 19 23 46 61 84 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Fig. 10. Near-field measurement setup.
Fig. 11. Far-field measurement setup.
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
A. Experimental Setup
RF signals are collected indoor from 14 micro-UAV con-
trollers operating at 2.4 GHz in near-field. Table I gives
the catalogue of the micro-UAV controllers used for data
collection and their class label (ID). The indoor experimen-
tal environment is very noisy with strong interference from
several sources operating in the 2.4 GHz frequency band: Wi-
Fi, Bluetooth and micro-wave oven. The experimental setup
for both near-field and far-field indoor scenarios are shown in
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Fig. 12. Impact of the features on the classification accuracy of the different
machine learning methods.
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Fig. 13. Classification accuracy versus SNR.
Figs. 10 and 11, respectively. The RF sensing and detection
system consists of a 6 GHz bandwidth Keysight MSOS604A
oscilloscope with the highest sampling frequency of 20 Gsa/s,
2 dBi omnidirectional antenna, and 24 dBi Wi-Fi grid antenna.
The antennas operate in the 2.4 GHz frequency band. The
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Fig. 14. Classification accuracy versus the number of controllers at SNR of
25 dB.
omnidirectional antenna is used to capture the UAV controller
RF signal at close distance while the grid antenna is used
for far-field signal capture (reduced SNR scenarios). At the
near-field, the SNR is about 30 dBi and decreasing with the
distance from the receiver.
The RF signals from the micro-UAV controllers are captured
by the antenna and fed into the oscilloscope (receiver system).
The collected data are automatically saved in a cloud database
for post processing. For each controller, 100 RF signals are
collected. Each RF signal is a vector of size 5000000× 1 and
has a time span of 0.25 ms. The database are partitioned with
the ratio p = 0.2. That is, 80% of the saved data is randomly
selected for training and the remaining 20% is used for testing
(4:1 partitioning).
B. Results
During the experiments, the environmental noise was fairly
static. However, there were significant scattering and absorp-
tion from objects in the hallway. We took measurements in
the hallway at various distances up to 130 m. We observed the
signal vanishes beyond 130 m. Thus, the hallway behaves like
a lossy rectangular waveguide. In addition, it was observed that
the polarization planes of the transmitter and receiver antennas
significantly affected the received signal strength. It was
noticed that ±3σ of the Wavelet transformed environmental
noise was around 0.0098 volts. Thus, throughout the work, T1
and T2 was set to ±0.0098 volts, respectively.
The performance of the detection algorithm is presented
in Table. II. As expected, we see that the detection ac-
curacy increases with the SNR. When SNR=10 dB, which
corresponds to a distance of 80 m, the detection accuracy
is 84%. The detection accuracy increases as we reduce the
distance between the UAV controller and receiver antenna. The
system is able to detect all the UAVs at any SNR values of
beyond 12 dB. The performance could be further improved by
attaching an external low-noise power amplifier to the input
of the oscilloscope. This will reduce the input noise from the
environment and improve the detection accuracy.
Once a UAV controller is detected, the received RF signal
should be classified to identify which UAV it is. In order to val-
idate the classification methods, 10 Monte Carlo simulations
are run. The average accuracy of each method is calculated for
a number of cases. Fig. 12 shows the classification accuracy
of each method as well as the impact of different feature
selections on the performance of that method. kNN and SVM
perform similarly with a classification accuracy of 96.3% and
96.84%, respectively, and are followed by DA with an accu-
racy of 88.15%. NN can only achieve a classification accuracy
of 58.49% when there are 14 micro-UAV controllers. Fig. 12
also verifies the results of NCA given in Fig. 9 where we
see the relative importance of the features in the classification
accuracy. From the figure, it is obvious that kurtosis is the most
significant feature, that is, the feature contributing the most to
the classification accuracy. As predicted by NCA, considering
skewness in addition to the other three features contributes the
least to the classification accuracy. This observation holds for
all the methods.
Fig. 13 shows the classification performance of the methods
at different SNRs. As expected, the classification accuracy
decreases as the distance between the UAV controller and the
receiver system increases. At an SNR of 25 dB, corresponding
to a distance of about 5 m, kNN achieves a classification
accuracy of about 97.29%. At this distance, DA and SVM
show similar performance. However, NN achieves a classi-
fication accuracy of only 57.14%. When the SNR is 10 dB,
corresponding to a distance of about 80 m, kNN, DA and SVM
achieves a classification accuracy between 60-70% while NN
performs below 50%.
In Fig. 14, we investigate the robustness and stability of the
classifiers as the number of UAV controllers increases. At SNR
of 25 dB, we see that the performance of the kNN, DA, and
SVM remains almost the same with the change in the number
of the controllers. However, NN shows instability when there
are 8 or more controllers. It is clear that the NN is not a good
choice unless there are 6 or less controllers at least with the
feature set used in this study.
It is obvious from the observations so far that kNN performs
the best and NN performs the worst. This is probably because
we did not optimize the hyper parameters of the NN algorithm.
In general, NN algorithms are very sensitive to the choice of
hyper parameters used. On the other hand, hyper-parameter
optimization was built into the kNN, DA and SVM classifiers
used in this study. Hyper-parameter optimization for the NN
method will be investigated in our future works. Therefore,
because of the superior performance of kNN in this study, it
will be considered as the base classification method.
Table III shows a sample confusion matrix obtained for the
kNN classifier. This table describes the performance of the
kNN model on a set of test data (RF signals) for which the
true labels are known. The test data were captured at an SNR
of 25 dB. The confusion matrix shows that kNN achieves
an accuracy of 97.1%. Except one or two samples from 4
controllers, the classsifier is not confused between the micro-
UAVs.
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TABLE III
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR THE KNN METHOD COMPUTED FROM 280 TEST SIGNALS OBTAINED FROM 14 DIFFERENT MICRO-UAV CONTROLLERS AT
SNR OF 25 DB.
Target Class
Pr
ed
ic
te
d
C
la
ss
ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Out (%)
1 20 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 95.2
2 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
3 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
4 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
5 0 0 0 0 20 2 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 80.0
6 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 1 94.7
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 100
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 100
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 100
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 18 0 0 94.7
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 100
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 100
Out
(%)
100 100 95 100 100 90 100 90 100 100 100 90 100 95 97.1
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the problem of detecting and
classifying micro-UAV control signals. The detection algo-
rithm uses a Bayesian approach based on the Markov models
of UAV and non-UAV classes while the classification method
relies on the energy-time domain RF signal and uses features
extracted in this domain. We show that the kNN classifier
performs the best while NN has the the worst performance
when considering lower SNR levels and increased number of
controllers. We obtain an accuracy of above 80% with the
kNN classifier up to SNR of 15 dB for 14 controllers. We also
show that it is possible to increase the number of controllers
up to a certain level without compromising the performance
using kNN and SVM methods where both result in accuracy of
above 95%. In the future work, we will perform experiments in
outdoor environment using multiple sensors and UAV signals
for micro-UAV detection and classification. This approach will
be more effective in modern electronic warfare environment,
where autonomous military UAVs employ low probability of
intercept (LPI) emitters which are difficult to detect by a
single RF sensing platform due to their low peak power. This
problem can be addressed in our future work by using netted
sensor fusion system and deep learning algorithms for cluster
fingerprinting based detection and classification of these LPI
emitters. Moreover, in such an advanced system, techniques
for specific emitter identification (SEI) such as the formation
of 3D feature cluster map could be investigated for improved
classification. These are beyond the scope of the current work.
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